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Was Africa rising? Narratives of development success
and failure among the Mozambican middle class
Andrew Brooks
ABSTRACT
Was Africa rising? Narratives of development success and failure among the Mozambican middle class.
Territory, Politics, Governance. In the 2000s and 2010s, a narrative of ‘Africa Rising’ was popularized by
businesses, donors, media and political leaders. High economic growth rates, increased investment from
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the export of natural resources supported
claims of development success. One group held up as beneﬁciaries was the emerging African middle class.
Despite the optimism, poverty ratios remained stable and impoverishment was widespread. Change was
occurring, but the gains were uneven. Mozambique had a liberalized economy and was at the forefront
of numerous accounts of Africa’s rise in 2014. Perceptions of change among middle-class Mozambicans
working in small and medium-sized enterprises in the hospitality, retail and construction sectors in the
capital Maputo were investigated. Economic growth enabled good performance for some businesses in
the capital city, but there were challenges such as regulations that hampered enterprises, rising inequality
and labour exploitation by foreign companies. There was frustration among the middle class with the
state and business elites. Through a process of extraversion, leaders in the ruling Mozambique Liberation
Front (FRELIMO) party worked as intermediaries between the global and national markets and gained
from uneven development. Mozambique served as an important example of how economic growth had
limited developmental beneﬁts for those in the middle.
KEYWORDS
Africa; BRICS (Brazil; Russia; India; China and South Africa); development; middle class; Mozambique; small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
摘要
非洲正在崛起？莫桑比克中产阶级有关发展成功与失败的叙事。Territory, Politics, Governance. 在2000年至
2010年之际，商业、捐赠者、媒体与政治领导人开始普遍推广 ‘非洲崛起’ 的叙事。高度经济成长率、来
自金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国与南非）投资的增加，以及自然资源的出口，支持了发展成功的
宣称。浮现中的非洲中产阶级，则成为受益的群体。尽管对发展抱持乐观主义，贫穷率仍然继续维持，而
困乏则相当普遍。改变正在发生，但其获益却分配不均。莫桑比克拥有自由化的经济，并位于2014年有
关非洲崛起的无数说法中的前沿。本文探讨在首都开普托的照护、零售与建筑部门的中小型企业中工作的
莫三比克中产阶级，对于上述改变的感知。经济成长，促进了首都城市中若干商业的良好表现，但仍有诸
如伤害企业的规范、扩大的贫富不均以及外资企业的劳动剥削之挑战。中产阶级对于国家和商业精英感到
挫败。透过向外延伸的过程，莫桑比克解放阵线党（FRELIMO）的执政者作为全球与国家市场之间的中
介，并从不均发展中获益。莫桑比克提供作为经济成长对中产阶级的发展益处如何有限之重要案例。
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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RÉSUMÉ
Peut-on parler de l’Afrique en essor? Communications sur les réussites et les échecs des développements
parmi les classes moyennes au Mozambique. Territory, Politics, Governance. Dans les années 2000 et
2010, une communication sur l’Afrique en Essor fut popularisé par des chefs d’entreprise, ainsi que par
des donateurs, les médias, et des personnalités politiques. Des taux de croissance élevés, une
augmentation des investissements par les pays du BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine et Afrique du Sud),
ainsi que l’exportation de ressources naturelles, appuyèrent les revendications relatives au succès de ces
développements. Un groupe retenu comme étant les bénéﬁciaires de cet essor est celui des classes
moyennes en Afrique. En dépit de cette vague d’optimisme, les taux de pauvreté restèrent stables, et
l’appauvrissement ne cessa guère. Des changements se produisaient, mais les bénéﬁces étaient irréguliers.
Le Mozambique, qui possédait une économie libéralisée, était à l’avant-garde d’un grand nombre de
comptes rendus relatifs à l’essor du continent africain, en 2014. On se pencha sur la perception d’un
changement parmi les classes moyennes du Mozambique travaillant dans des petites et moyennes
entreprises des secteurs de l’hôtellerie, de la vente au détail, et du bâtiment dans la capitale Maputo.
L’essor économique se traduisit par la réalisation de bons résultats pour certaines entreprises de la capitale,
en dépit de certaines difﬁcultés, par exemple la réglementation, qui entravait le travail des entreprises, des
inégalités croissantes, et l’exploitation de la main-d’œuvre par des entreprises étrangères. On releva la
frustration des classes moyennes vis à vis de l’état et des élites du secteur des affaires. Par le biais d’un
processus d’extraversion, les leaders du parti du Front de Libération du Mozambique (FRELIMO) jouèrent
un rôle d’intermédiaires entre les marchés mondiaux et nationaux, et tirèrent proﬁt de l’inégalité dans le
développement. Le Mozambique représente un exemple important de la façon dont l’essor économique
présente des bénéﬁces développementaux limités pour les classes moyennes.
MOTS-CLÉS
Afrique; BRICS (Brésil; Russie; Inde; Chine et Afrique du Sud); développement; classes moyennes;
Mozambique; petites et moyennes entreprises (PME)
RESUMEN
¿Estaba África en auge? Narrativas sobre el éxito y el fracaso del desarrollo en la clase media de Mozambique.
Territory, Politics, Governance. En las décadas de 2000 y 2010, los comercios, donantes, medios de
comunicación y líderes políticos popularizaron la narrativa del ‘auge de África’. Factores como las altas
tasas de crecimiento económico, el incremento de inversiones por parte de los países BRICS (Brasil, Rusia,
India, China y Sudáfrica) y la exportación de los recursos naturales respaldaron las declaraciones sobre el
éxito de las iniciativas de desarrollo. Uno de los grupos supuestamente más beneﬁciados fue la emergente
clase media africana. Pese al optimismo, las tasas de pobreza siguieron siendo las mismas y el
empobrecimiento era general. El cambio ocurrió pero las ganancias fueron desiguales. Mozambique tenía
una economía liberalizada y fue pionera de numerosos relatos del auge de África en 2014. Se analizaron
las percepciones de cambio entre la clase media de Mozambique que trabaja en pequeñas y medianas
empresas en el sector hospitalario, de comercio minorista y de construcción en la capital Maputo. El
crecimiento económico permitió un buen rendimiento en algunos negocios de la capital, pero surgieron
problemas tales como las regulaciones que ponían en diﬁcultad a las empresas, aumentando la
desigualdad y la explotación laboral por parte de empresas extranjeras. La clase media se sentía frustrada
con las elites estatales y comerciales. Mediante un proceso de extraversión, los líderes que dirigían el
partido gobernante del Frente de Liberación de Mozambique (FRELIMO) actuaron de intermediarios entre
los mercados internacionales y nacionales y se aprovecharon del desarrollo desequilibrado. Mozambique
es un importante ejemplo de cómo el crecimiento económico solo aportó ventajas limitadas para el
progreso de la clase media.
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INTRODUCTION
The ﬁrst decade and a half of the twenty-ﬁrst century was a period of economic growth and change
for the world’s poorest continent. African economies rapidly expanded and a positive narrative of
‘Africa rising’ took hold among business leaders and policy-makers (‘Africa rising’, 2011; Taylor,
2016). New investors from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as well as
established stakeholders from the global North capitalized on the continent’s rich natural resources
leading to an export boom (Carmody, 2011). Copper, natural gas, oil, hardwood and other com-
modities fuelled economic growth and spurred vibrant commercial activity. New construction pro-
jects transformed major cities, and consumer imports grew tremendously (Hicks, 2015).
Development appeared to be working south of the Sahara. If there was one place above all others
which encapsulated the new sense of conﬁdence, it was Mozambique (UN News Centre, 2013).
In Maputo, the Mozambican capital, businesses ﬂourished and new downtown construction pro-
jects symbolized urban development (Barros, Chivangue, & Samagaio, 2014). The city and the
nation represented the mood of optimism that permeated among the international development
community (IMF, 2011; The Business Year, 2014). The International Monetary Fund reinforced
this message by choosing to host their 2014 conference in Maputo. The event was unambiguously
titled ‘Africa rising: Building to the future’ (IMF, 2014). Yet, despite this positive narrative, there
was a disconnect between the celebration of a new dawn for Africa and the reality of persistent
poverty in Mozambique (Castel-Branco, 2015; Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012; Hanlon, 2015).
At a continental scale, the narrative of ‘Africa rising’ was driven by a belief in the power of lib-
eral economic policies, entrepreneurship and free trade to encourage economic growth and social
progress, and for the spread of democracy to foster improved governance (Basu & Srinivasan,
2002; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). One group highlighted as beneﬁciaries of change were the
emerging middle classes (Mazzolini, 2016). In contrast, critics of the rising narrative pointed to
development failures across Africa, highlighting the uneven distribution of growth, widespread
poverty, and the prevalence of unaccountable and authoritarian leaders (Bush & Harrison,
2014; Hart, 2013). Narratives of development ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ provided captivating, but
partial and imagined perspectives, produced through the construction of speciﬁc discourses
(Hofmeyr, 2013; Taylor, 2016). Nuanced national studies have unpicked some accounts of rising
Africa and other optimistic narratives (Moran & Pitcher, 2004; Pérez Niño & Le Billon, 2014;
Phillips, Hailwood, & Brooks, 2016; Pureza, Roque, Rafael, & Cravo, 2007), yet limited primary
research has been undertaken with those in the middle, that may have done well out of formal
employment in middle-class occupations (Melber, 2016). The perceptions of this population in
Maputo provide important insights into the successes and failures of recent change in
Mozambique.
This article opens with an account of the ‘Africa rising’ literature and its critics, with a particu-
lar focus on the middle classes. The next section examines how the idea of Mozambique’s
development success gained purchase (IDA, 2009; IMF, 2014; UN News Centre, 2013). The
counter-narrative follows; critics argued that international donors and investors and their partners
in government in Maputo had been unable to combat poverty and deliver meaningful develop-
ment (Alfani, Azzarri, d’Errico, & Molini, 2012; Castel-Branco, 2015; Hanlon & Smart,
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2008). The subsequent empirical contribution is positioned against this background of competing
perspectives, and interrogates how the economic, social and political landscape of Mozambique
was understood by people working in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in downtown
Maputo in 2014. Research examined if they understoodMozambique to be a development success
or failure; assessed how SMEs were performing; and explored both the role of foreign investors
and the government in facilitating or hindering the growth of businesses and the middle class.
One of the core tenets of liberal economic theory is that an open marketplace will encourage
foreign direct investment (FDI), among other things, and enable SMEs to prosper (Obstfeld,
1998). In theory, reducing state intervention in the market should free entrepreneurial business
people to grow their companies and foster a vibrant and competitive economy. Efﬁcient SMEs
will then be able to create new opportunities for wealth generation and employment. Local and
foreign-owned businesses should be able to capitalize on economic growth and produce beneﬁts
for society as a whole and encourage middle-class employment (Friedman, 2008; Yago &Morgan,
2008). Mozambique had adopted liberal principles in its pursuit of development. A priority in the
2011–2014 Poverty Reduction Action Plan was to stimulate employment and ‘Create an environ-
ment favorable to the creation and development of MSMEs1 [micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises] and the attraction of domestic and foreign investment into labor-intensive industries’
(IMF, 2011, p. 18). Drawing on ﬁeldwork in June and July 2014 with 100 SMEs in Maputo, this
article explores how owners and workers perceived the progress of development in Mozambique.
Of particular concern were the businesses’ relationships with the emerging BRICS and Portugal,
the former colonial power (Akwagyiram, 2013; Alden & Chichava, 2014). Field research in 2014
showed that the ‘success’ narrative was partially endorsed by middle-class people working within
the hospitality, clothing retail and construction enterprises in Maputo’s downtown that comprised
the sample. They discussed how SMEs had grown and beneﬁtted from foreign investment, but
were sceptical about the employment opportunities and the broader social effects of economic
change. Importantly, they were critical of the relationships between the Mozambican government
and foreign investment.
CONTEXTUALISING AFRICA RISING
Africa rising was a narrative that represented a major shift in the way the continent was perceived.
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta summed this up in 2015 by declaring: ‘The narrative of African
despair is false, and indeed was never true. Let them know that Africa is open and ready for
business’ when he shared a stage with Barack Obama as co-host of a summit on entrepreneurship
(Aljazeera, 2015). Both presidents spoke positively about the role of global business and the enter-
prising middle-class Africans who they argued could beneﬁt from new market opportunities and
spur development. These two economic actors, international capital and the emerging middle
class, each formed part of the rising narrative, although their interests are often very different.
This section ﬁrst considers the political economy of how foreign businesses and local elites trans-
formed African economies, before secondly discussing how the optimism surrounding the rising
middle classes was misplaced.
African economies became increasingly open to foreign investment and trade in the 2000s.
Liberal policies had spread through structural adjustment in the 1990s; state companies were pri-
vatized, public spending reduced, currencies devalued, public sector pay cut, and subsidies, price
controls and some taxes were removed (Collier, 2008). Stable governments and encouragement
from international institutions, including the IMF and African Development Bank, promoted
the inward investment of capital (ADB, 1999; IMF, 2011). Economic expansion brought gross
domestic product (GDP) growth of around 5% per year between 2000 and 2014 to sub-Saharan
Africa (World Bank, 2016b). New foreign investment in natural resources, catalysed by high glo-
bal commodity prices fuelled growth. Companies from the global North, the BRICS and
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elsewhere, sunk new oil wells, opened new mines and felled old tracts of hardwood forest (Carm-
ody, 2011). An export boom underpinned the optimistic Africa rising rhetoric that spread across
the pages of the international business press. The Economistmagazine captured this changing nar-
rative through its evolving portrayal of Africa. In May 2000, the front cover was pessimistically
titled ‘Hopeless Africa’; by February 2001, this had shifted to ‘Africa’s elusive dawn’; in July
2005, ‘Helping Africa to help itself’; in December 2011, ‘Africa rising’ and by March 2013, the
headline read ‘Aspiring Africa’.
Some critical commentators characterized this phenomena as a ‘New scramble for Africa’
(Carmody, 2011). As with the late nineteenth-century scramble, foreign powers were exporting
resource wealth and unequal relationships with external capital were being forged (Hilary,
2016). Fanon’s (1967) conception of false decolonization, or neo-colonialism, helps partially to
explain why African societies remained poor, but to equate this period of uneven development
with a continuation of colonial relationships neglects the ways in which capitalism was actively
and continually reworked. Foremost in shaping the spatial patterns of economic change were
the new deals and compromises negotiated between African leaders and foreign powers. African
elites were active in both facilitating capital ﬂows and constraining some business activities. Rather
than passively following the interests of either the global North or other new sources of invest-
ment, such as the BRICS, sometimes, they worked with foreign powers or local interests and
at other times, they opposed them (Bayart, 1993). African leaders had some autonomy of action
and switched alliances and forged connections with different constellations of capital. For
example, President Robert Mugabe isolated Zimbabwe from British and other Western involve-
ment and left the Commonwealth in 2003, at the same time as he enthusiastically courted new
trade deals and investment from China (Raftopoulos, 2010). Elsewhere in southern Africa, Pre-
sident Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi attempted to break from neoliberal orthodoxy and fostered
a series of unequal relationship to beneﬁt himself and his allies (Brooks & Loftus, 2016). Leaders
like Mugabe and Mutharika purposefully and proﬁtably fostered links between local patrons and
clients and enriched patrimonial networks among the elite upper classes of African society (Chabal
& Daloz, 1999). Classifying such leaders either as nationalists who resisted neo-colonialism, or as
collaborators with international business, fails to capture the manner in which they actively shaped
their relations with domestic and external environments. Instead, this process is better encapsu-
lated by what Jean-François Bayart had previously termed ‘extraversion’ (Bayart, 1993).
In his analysis of relationships between African societies and the global economy, Bayart
(1993, 2000) paid careful attention to the fragmented class structures of post-independence
Africa. He explored how political society and capital had been unable to intensify the exploitation
of their dependents through mass formal employment. Despite the limited potential for surplus
extraction from the local population, political and economic elites still ﬂourished. The ruling
classes leveraged their position as gatekeepers to Africa’s valuable natural resources, as well as
their roles as leaders of the world’s poorest people to take advantage of the aid and loans available
to developing countries (Bayart, 1993). After African countries experienced economic liberaliza-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s local dominant groups continued to extract money and power from
their position as intermediaries vis-à-vis the international system, gaining revenues from agricul-
tural levies, natural resource extraction, consumer imports, business deals, foreign investments and
aid. Elites used their status for personal gain, which did include corruption, but also meant con-
testing or adopting the ethical and cultural values of the West (Bayart, 2000). For instance, pol-
icies like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were warmly adopted by some leaders,
such as Joyce Banda in Malawi (Harland Scott, 2013). Whereas others actively rejected values
that they framed as ‘Western’. The most notorious examples being Uganda’s popularist anti-
gay laws (Sadgrove, Vanderbeck, Andersson, Valentine, & Ward, 2012).
National elites used African innovations to overcome the weak productive forces and bitterness
of internal social struggles to accumulate wealth and power (Hart, 2013). Bayart’s (1993) account
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explains this change, led from within African states, in a way that avoids the ‘structuralist
weaknesses’ of dependency theory, which implies a continuation of collaboration through neo-
colonialism, underplaying the role of the African bourgeoisie. Central to Bayart’s work was a
focus on the ‘understanding’ reached with former colonizers, foreign capital and international
agencies (western donors, IMF, UN) by African elites in the aftermath of independence. By the
2000s, new ‘understandings’ were being reached with other sources of investment such as the
BRICS, which not only offered alternative sources of ﬁnance but represented different cultural
and political interests (Carmody, 2013). African elites were active agents in the making of their
histories and the reworking of capitalist development. The new, expanding and diverse inward
ﬂows of capital strengthened their position, and for leaders dependent on international ties, promot-
ing the rising narrative further helped them to make Africa an attractive destination for investment.
The second group of economic actors that feature prominently alongside international
businesses in the Africa rising narrative were the ‘emerging’ African middle classes, although
this was a difﬁcult group to classify (Melber, 2016). Following independence, the middle classes
were weak across Africa and lacked collective identities and class consciousness (Akinkugbe &
Wohlmuth, 2016). Structural adjustment had further diminished the status of state sector pro-
fessionals, such as teachers and eroded middle-class livelihoods in the private sector, including
for salaried works in clothing industries (Ericsson & Brooks, 2015). But in the 2000s and
2010s, ‘middle class’ emerged as an attractive label, because it was a malleable socio-economic cat-
egory that could be embraced both by African leaders, such as Kenyatta, as well as international
proponents of neoliberalism. Local politicians were attracted to the ‘middle’ as it was an inclusive
identity. The notion that the majority of people, or at least a signiﬁcant proportion, belonged to a
common ‘middle’ could help dispel tensions between classes as well as the pronounced regional
and ethnic heterogeneity that characterized many African countries, such as Kenya (Neubert,
2016). The middle-class label further ﬁtted the rising narrative, as it reinforced the notion that
neoliberal policies were working and that Africa was home to an emerging population. For the
optimistic proponents of Africa rising, including international business leaders, policy-makers
and market analysts, ‘middle class’ was attractive, as it moved emphasis away from the state’s
responsibility for society and resonated with individual achievement and the rise of entrepreneuri-
alism, despite the relative dearth of SMEs in Africa (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016). In Africa,
middle-class identity meant something different from the categorization of formal, secure blue-
collar employment, familiar in the United States or the above-average status of white-collar
workers in the UK. The torch bearers for the new African middle classes were neither factory
workers nor the salaried bureaucrats and professionals of the immediate post-independence
period, but instead the new winners of neoliberal globalization, who in small numbers, beneﬁted
from growth in import–export industries, computing, construction, hospitality, retail, telecommu-
nications and other service sectors (Lentz, 2016). The middle-class label may have been con-
venient to apply in Africa, but there was disconnect between the few people in between the
rich and poor who beneﬁtted from economic growth, and the wide range of Africans ofﬁcially
classiﬁed as middle class. Broad consumption spans are employed by a variety of inﬂuential econ-
omists. The World Bank Chief Economist Martin Ravallion’s deﬁnition of middle class is any
household with a per capita consumption of US$2 to US$13 a day at purchasing power parity,
whereas the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report uses a
daily income or expenditure of between US$10 and US$100 (Ravallion, 2010; UNDP, 2013).
Taking either US$2 or even US$10 a day as a baseline for qualifying for membership places every-
one short of the starving in the middle class. If someone was struggling to survive on US$2, they
may be in the ‘middle’ of African society, but they share little with middle-class consumers in other
regions (Brooks & Bryant, 2013; Melber, 2016).
The label ‘middle class’ can be useful as an analytical category in the African context, but only
when the term is applied critically. In the context of the following empirical case study, it is used
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when making reference to the formally employed workers and owners of SMEs whose livelihoods
are better than the majority of poor Mozambicans. Before the discussion of the ﬁeldwork, the next
section reviews the narrative of Africa rising with reference to development success in Mozambi-
que and demonstrates how and why success was articulated. The subsequent section on failures
illustrates how the uneven progression of capitalism fostered inequality and did not address pov-
erty in Mozambique. In the following discussion of empirical work, the way in which middle-class
Mozambicans are simultaneously encouraged by local economic growth in downtownMaputo, yet
disappointed by limited wider social progress, is analysed. Owners, managers and workers in
SMEs struggled to understand the inequality reproduced through the progression of capitalism
in Mozambique. The concluding section places these ambiguities within in a wider discussion
of the political economy of Mozambique and the rising Africa narrative.
DEVELOPMENT ‘SUCCESS’ IN MOZAMBIQUE
The Republic of Mozambique has experienced much tragedy. Accounts of development success
are only a recent phenomenon that followed after years of warfare and a painful period of economic
reforms. Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, but soon became embroiled in
a vicious civil war between the socialist FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) govern-
ment and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), a resistance movement backed by Rho-
desia and Apartheid South Africa, which fought a brutal campaign to destabilize socialism
(Simon, 1999). Desperately poor and conﬂict ravaged, Mozambique was one of the world’s
most impoverished countries in the 1980s. Following independence, European settlers with tech-
nical skills ﬂed the country and some even sabotaged industrial machinery, which ‘shattered the
economy’ (Hanlon, 1984, p. 48). Basic health care and education were terrible. In 1985, life
expectancy was 41.8 years and the mean years of schooling was only 0.8 years (UNDP, 2016a).
Internal strife, the lack of the appropriate material conditions for industry and a substantial
debt burden, meant the FRELIMO leadership were unable to deliver their progressive and revo-
lutionary ideas (Phiri, 2012).
In the early phases of independence, FRELIMO established a nascent socialism regime, but
this failed because of the legacy of colonialism, the narrow economic base and the impacts of con-
ﬂict (Pitcher, 2003). FRELIMO may have won the wars against the Portuguese and against
destabilization, but socialism lost the peace. The ruling party transitioned from being a progressive
socialist movement that led the ﬁght for independence, to one that embraced capitalism and per-
petuated the uneven development they had previously fought against. The government’s actions
after the 1990s were still couched in revolutionary rhetoric, but socialist goals were abandoned
and there was a transition to a liberal free market economy. Reforms were implemented through
the Economic Rehabilitation Programmes (ERPs), an IMF and World Bank-inﬂuenced struc-
tural adjustment that started in 1987 (Moran & Pitcher, 2004). The ERPs successfully liberalized
the economy and dismantled the socialist machinery of central administrative controls and pro-
moted a market-based economy by allowing price and credit policies to determine resource
allocation (ADB, 1999). Mozambique was transformed, but the ERPs brought further de-indus-
trialization and great social hardships (Pitcher, 2003). FRELIMO oversaw a shift away from the
settler-dominated colonial capitalism, based on mercantilist primary product extraction and
racially determined exploitation, to an economy based on the principles of the Washington Con-
sensus (ADB, 1999). Rather than the corporate monopolies that characterized the Portuguese
colonial economy, in areas such as cotton agriculture, the Frelimo government promoted a liberal
approach and encouraged inward investment. Following the start of economic reforms, and in par-
allel with the regional geopolitical shifts that saw the emergence of a new post-Apartheid South
Africa, the donor community brokered a 1992 peace agreement between RENAMO and FRE-
LIMO (Simon, 1999). This negotiated settlement and major aid commitments institutionalized
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the Western powers’ role in policy-making (Pérez Niño & Le Billon, 2014). A total of US$34.2
billion of aid ﬂowed in to Mozambique between 1992 and 2014 from the Global North donors
that make up the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (World Bank, 2017). Peace
brought relative political stability and the shift to a liberal economy gave the emphasis for the myth
of free market progress to take hold (Phiri, 2012). In tandem, FRELIMO participated in a nom-
inally democratic process and contested ﬁve presidential and parliamentary elections, persistently
winning more than 50% of the vote. Although doubts have been cast of the fairness of elections,
RENAMO and other smaller opposition parties have received limited support (Hanlon, 2010).
FRELIMO’s leaders have beneﬁtted from electoral success and economic growth. Through
processes of extraversion, Mozambican elites carved out opportunities for capital accumulation
working as intermediaries between the local and global economies (Hanlon & Mosse, 2010).
The prime example was Armando Guebuza, who was elected the third president of Mozambique
in 2005 and served until 2015. Guebuza had been a general during the ﬁght for liberation and the
conﬂict with RENAMO. Later, this former socialist revolutionary became one of the wealthiest
people in Mozambique, nicknamed ‘Mr Gue-Business’. He grew enterprises in the 1990s and
held stakes in Banco Mercantil de Investmentos, brewer Laurentina limited (part of South Africa’s
SABMiller) and telecommunications company Vodacom (owned by South Africa’s Telkom and
Britain’s Vodafone) (Nhachote, 2012). Guebuza’s shift from liberation leader to internationally
networked tycoon embodies the integral relationship between business and government and is
emblematic of the broader transformation in the Mozambican political economy (Sumich,
2008). A nominally democratic government opened the economy to trade and investment and
the expansion of market forces. One form of capitalism was replaced by another, without popular
participation. In a similar pattern to the ideological shift of the ANC in South Africa, FRE-
LIMO, a socialist movement that was established to represent the masses and voices from
below, was co-opted to establish a liberal capitalist state (Hart, 2013). The party was transformed
by social groups and individuals like Guebeza. Working within the hegemony of the new political
order, leadership from within the state replaced broader society, which was previously at the fore-
front of driving change through the revolutionary independence struggle.
Since the end of the civil war, Mozambique has remained free from major conﬂict – although
there were violent disturbances in 2013–2016 – and experienced one of the highest non-oil GDP
growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. Peace and economic growth provided the foundation for the
‘success story’. In 2002, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Koﬁ Annan, hailed
‘Mozambique’s continuing success story and the climate of trust it has generated [which] is the
best possible antidote to the sceptics and cynics about Africa’ (UN News Centre, 2002). After
Annan’s statement, Mozambique was consistently held up as an ‘important success story for
the global community’ (Ban Ki-moon quoted by UN News Centre, 2013) as it moved from war-
fare to peace and stability and made ‘signiﬁcant progress in terms of socioeconomic development’
(IMF, 2011, p. 5). Positive comparisons were made in contrast to oil-rentier Angola, conﬂict-
scarred Liberia and corrupt Guinea Bissau (Moran & Pitcher, 2004; Pérez Niño & Le Billon,
2014; Pureza et al., 2007).
From 1986, immediately before the implementation of the ERPs, to 2014, the Mozambican
economy grew at an average of 4.73% per capita, per annum. Economic growth came from a low
base. GDP per capita (current US$) was $399 in 1986 and $623 in 2014 (World Bank, 2016a).
Mozambique was still among the poorest countries in the world, ranked 180th out of 188 states, in
2014 (UNDP, 2016b). Steady economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s resulted from a peace
dividend that saw production improve after hostilities ceased. One of the key chapters in Mozam-
bique’s success story was the openness to FDI. Attractive arrangements for foreign investors
included contracts negotiated on a case-by-case basis and low levels of taxation for major foreign
investors (Phiri, 2012). National economic policy focused on fostering big projects such as
MOZAL, an aluminium processing facility near Maputo, which employed only 1,910 workers,
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but accounted for 40% of exports (Pérez Niño & Le Billon, 2014, p. 91). Foreign investors played
an especially crucial role in the extractive industries, because Mozambique lacked a strong national
mining, oil or gas company. In addition to the large projects, there was foreign investment at the
medium and small scales, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in Maputo, and the capital city
attracted 25% of all FDI (Vines, Thompson, Jensen, & Azevedo-Harman, 2015). Investment
came from the Global North and the emerging global powers that were praised by Guebuza:
‘the BRICS have a role to play to accelerate the development of African economies’ (‘BRICS
won’t colonise Africa’, 2013).
Mozambique had long had support from China, the most important of the BRICS, and Chi-
nese companies were some of the ﬁrst to enter Mozambique after the war. Chinese exports to
Mozambique increased from US$61.8 million in 2004 to US$1.06 billion in 2014 and included
industrial goods such as vehicles and consumer products, whereas Chinese imports fromMozam-
bique were US$35.1 million in 2004 and US$541 million in 2014, when 58% of goods were rough
and sawn wood. This trade imbalance mirrors Mozambique’s broader negative trade balance of US
$3.04 billion in 2014, which had worsened over the preceding decade and is a further indicator of
faltering economic policy (OEC, 2016). South Africa was Mozambique’s largest two-way trading
partner. Key investors include the South African hydrocarbon company Sasol, which has devel-
oped the gas ﬁelds near Inhambane, as well as many other natural resource projects and small
businesses in tourism and retail. Two of the other BRICS were also very signiﬁcant; India was
the third largest importer of Mozambican exports in 2014 (US$638 million, 82% of which is
coal and carbon products) (OEC, 2016); Brazil was an important partner with over 40 projects,
and the Brazilian ﬁrm Vale ﬁrst bid to develop the mega Moatize coal deposits in Tete province
in 2004. Russian trade with Mozambique was small.
Development has been uneven. Beyond Mozal, the natural resource sector, Maputo’s vibrant
urban economy, and increased consumer imports, liberalization did not spur widespread new
economic activity (Giesbert & Schindler, 2012; Pitcher, 2003). In the 1990s, the end of hostilities
enabled a national reduction in poverty, but welfare improvements and vital infrastructure projects
later stalled, and yet a strong developmental narrative stemming from the immediate post-war
period persisted (Vines et al., 2015). Selectively applying the label of a post-conﬂict society helped
to provide evidence to support external interventions by the IMF andWorld Bank and the broader
legitimization of liberal capitalism (Hanlon &Mosse, 2010). Perhaps most important in cement-
ing Mozambique’s status as a rising success story was that it followed most of the policy prescrip-
tions of the donors and received a very substantial amount of overseas development assistance
(ADB, 1999). A positive news story was needed to satisfy the combined interest of the inter-
national community and FRELIMO to illustrate not only the beneﬁts of the progression of
post-war capitalism, but that liberalization can work (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012).
DEVELOPMENT ‘FAILURE’ IN MOZAMBIQUE
The counter argument of development failure in Mozambique is well established (Cunguara,
2012). Foremost has been the work of Joseph Hanlon and his various co-authors, who have cri-
tiqued the inconsistencies between the positive narrative surrounding Mozambique and the per-
sistence of poverty (Cunguara &Hanlon, 2012; Hanlon, 2015).Welfare did initially improve after
hostilities ceased in 1992, but long-term progress towards poverty reduction was disappointing.
World Bank (2015) data showed a reduction in the poverty headcount ratio from 69.4% in
1996 to 54.1% in 2002, although progress stalled and the ratio was 54.7% in 2008. The
Human Development Index (HDI) rank showed an absolute increase from 0.218 in 1990 to
0.300 in 2000, 0.401 in 2010, and 0.416 in 2014 (UNDP, 2016b). Much of this improvement
can be accounted for by increased income (measured by GNI PPP$ (Gross National Income
per capita at purchasing power parity), and an input into the HDI) and relative performance
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was dire. Mozambique’s ranking of 180th in the HDI was constant from 2009 to 2014. In 2014,
Mozambique’s HDI was worse than conﬂict-raged societies including Afghanistan, DRC
(Congo) and South Sudan. The MDGs provided another international metric for measuring
development success or failure. By the end of the reporting period in 2015, Mozambique had
not met any of the eight MDGs (MDGI, 2016). A notable failure of international development
assistance. FRELIMO ensured a degree of ‘democratization’ and satisﬁed donors by enabling lib-
eralization and ‘good governance’, but this political progress occurred without transforming the
livelihoods of the poor (Bertelsen, 2016).
The economic growth enabled by liberalization and increased FDI brought little beneﬁt to the
poor and did not lift the masses out of poverty, especially in rural areas. Billions of dollars of invest-
ment in natural resource resulted in relatively few jobs. Free market reforms attracted new sources
of capital and increased the availability of foreign imports, but undermined local industry (Pitcher,
2003). Manufacturing employed less than 3% of the labour force and grew slower than the econ-
omy as a whole (Cruz, Newman, Rand, & Tarp, 2017, p. 111). Even within Maputo city, notably,
only 1 in 10 of the population was formally employed (Vines et al., 2015). Through processes of
extraversion, wealth gains were concentrated within the hands of an elite based in and around
Maputo and closely linked to FRELIMO (Sumich, 2008). Hundreds of Mozambican million-
aires were created at a rate that rivalled any other African country (Kew, 2015). Meanwhile severe
impoverishment prevailed in rural areas, especially in central and northern Mozambique. There
were ﬂuctuations in rural households income, but they converged around the poverty line and
communities were collectively trapped in generalized underdevelopment with few prospects for
signiﬁcant improvements in livelihoods (Phiri, 2012). Projects to alleviate poverty had a poor
record and less than half of the donors’ poverty reduction plans were achieved (Giesbert & Schind-
ler, 2012). Food insecurity was prevalent across rural and urban communities. Around 30% of
households consumed on average less than 1,000 k-calories per person per day, well below the
minimum standards for survival given by the World Health Organization (Alfani et al., 2012).
The poor were also exposed to market price shifts (Raimundo, Crush, & Pendleton, 2014). In
2010, there were riots over the rising cost of bread in Maputo (Bertelsen, 2016). Housing was
a major challenge and the middle class as well as the poor were unable to afford appropriate accom-
modation (Mazzolini, 2016). This suite of evidence casts doubt on Ban Ki-moon’s 2013 claim
that Mozambique offered an ‘important success story’ (UN News Centre, 2013).
Further indictors also challenged the reputation of Mozambique as a ‘poster child’ for democ-
racy including evidence of endemic abuse of state power (Moran & Pitcher, 2004). Corruption
was rampant in the Alfândega (customs services) and bribes were paid on an estimated 54% of
all imported cargo (Vines et al., 2015). FRELIMO was bolstered by a highly partisan police
force and the material and human capacities of the state supported the ruling party. The partidar-
ização (partization) of the state apparatus meant public funds were channelled through avenues
that strengthened FRELIMO (Pérez Niño & Le Billon, 2014). In comparison, RENAMO
and the smaller third party MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique) were ﬁnancially
and organizationally weak (Hanlon, 2010). This power imbalance contributed to violent
skirmishes in 2013–2014 between RENAMO supporters and government forces. Prominent
civil and legal critics of the government were silenced in politicized murders, including the killings
of Journalist Carlos Cardoso (2000), Banking Ofﬁcial António Siba-Siba Macuácua (2001), Cus-
toms Director Orlando José (2010), Judge Dinis Silica (2014) and Lawyer Gilles Cistac (2015).
Their deaths constrained the investigation of fraud and corruption and supressed the freedom of
speech, highlighting the limits of Mozambique’s democracy (Brooks, 2012a; Ganho, 2016).
Something else common between all these killings is that they occurred in the afﬂuent neighbour-
hoods of Maputo, in the banks, cafes and streets which epitomized Mozambique’s rise. Maputo is
the heart of Mozambican political as well as commercial life. This review has demonstrated that
there was economic growth and transformation, but also many governance challenges and
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development failures in Mozambique; the next section draws on ﬁeldwork to explore how change
was understood by the middle class in downtown Maputo.
RESEARCHING DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE IN MAPUTO
In 2014, Maputo was beneﬁting from increased FDI from China and other sources (Alden &
Chichava, 2014), growing imports (Hanlon & Smart, 2008) and record numbers of Portuguese
expatriates relocating to the capital city (Akwagyiram, 2013). These changes provided the impetus
for ‘building for the future’ (IMF, 2014). In line with the neoliberal model, people who were either
entrepreneurs themselves, or employed in local businesses, should have been observing the devel-
opment of the nation at ﬁrst hand and beneﬁtting from economic growth (Friedman, 2008; Yago
& Morgan, 2008). To understand how development was perceived by people at the vanguard of
Maputo’s vibrant urban economy, empirical research was undertaken with owners, manager and
employees who worked in SMEs in June and July 2014 and who formed part of the Mozambican
middle class. The objective of the empirical work was twofold. First, to establish if they shared in
the narrative of development success or if they felt that there had been a failure of development in
Mozambique. Secondly, to explain how they had formed these opinions, especially in relation to
understanding the role of both the FRELIMO government and foreign investors, principally the
BRICS and Portugal.
The sample of Maputo interviewees consisted of people from three types of enterprises: cloth-
ing and accessories retailers, hospitality and entertainment venues (bakeries, bars, cafes, restau-
rants and hotels), and construction businesses (building merchants and contractors). After
initial scoping and pilot research inMay 2014, these sectors were selected because they were acces-
sible entrepreneurial SMEs staffed by middle-class Mozambicans who were likely to have bene-
ﬁtted from liberalization and economic growth in downtownMaputo (IMF, 2011). Liberalization
had enabled the import of new apparel (Ericsson & Brooks, 2015), leisure providers beneﬁtted
from increases in tourism and middle-class spending (Vines et al., 2015), and building companies
enjoyed a boom in new construction and infrastructure projects (The Business Year, 2014).
Businesses in the Baixa, or downtown, of central Maputo along three major retail avenues: Avenue
25 de Setembro, Avenue 24 de Julho and Avenue Vladimir Lenine, and in the Maputo Shopping
Centre, were selected as these core downtown areas were a focus for commercial growth (Barros
et al., 2014; Melo, 2013). Construction ﬁrms operating in the areas of Benﬁca and Matola were
also included as fewer of these businesses were located in the Baxia. Small to medium enterprises
were approached for interview (93% of the sample had 20 or fewer employees). A purposeful
sampling approach yielded 100 responses of which approximately half the interviewees (53%)
were in low-level roles and half (47%) in supervisory, managerial or ownership positions. The
sample consisted of 78% Mozambican-owned and 22% foreign-owned businesses, which were
primarily Portuguese (n = 9). The research tool combined elements of a survey and a structured
interview. Respondents were asked a total of 65 questions including 48 closed questions and 17
open qualitative questions, which allowed for expansive and in-depth answers. Questions focused
on change over a 10-year period (2004–2014), the performance of businesses, relationships with
foreign investors, and the role of the government in delivering change. The interviews were
completed by the author and three Mozambican ﬁeld assistants in Portuguese (n = 87), English
(n = 10) and the local language of Changana (n = 3).
FIELD RESEARCH FINDINGS
Four main themes are discussed through this section drawing together analysis of the participants’
responses to a range of questions: (a) Has Mozambique been a development success or failure? (b)
How were SMEs in downtown Maputo performing? (c) What was the role of foreign investment
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in economic change? (d) What was the role of the FRELIMO government in facilitating or hin-
dering business?
Has Mozambique been a development success or failure?
The interviewees all worked in formal sector SMEs in central Maputo and would be expected to
have personally gained from economic change, especially the managers and business owners.
Research demonstrated that this was correct. Even the lowest-level employees were assessed by
the researchers to have living standards considerably higher than the average documented in
Maputo’s informal sector, as well as in the majority of the rural population (Alfani et al., 2012;
Brooks, 2012b). The research participants were part of a middle class and had enjoyed some of
the beneﬁts of increased opportunities for consumption. As one interviewee argued: ‘We are
proof that life is becoming better’ (I.43), offering evidence that at least some people entered a
Mozambican middle class, although they were few in number. Participants were asked if they
agreed that the Mozambican economy had grown, and if they agreed that there had been a
reduction in poverty in the last 10 years: 86% either agreed or strongly agreed that there had
been economic growth and 72% agreed or strongly agreed that poverty had been reduced. But
in open interviews, respondents expressed a more nuanced understanding of economic change
and a less positive picture of national poverty reduction. Livelihoods were ‘getting better in the
cities, but rural areas are still poor’ (I.56) and there are ‘difﬁculties for other people’ (I.38). Within
Maputo, there was frustration over the uneven distribution of development gains, as it ‘depends on
the social level’ (I.51) and the mais elevado (higher classes) enjoyed the beneﬁts of growth, whereas
living standards had stagnated for many employees: ‘Life is better for some, but for workers it is
staying the same’ (I.96). Outside the formal economy, people were being left behind: ‘the majority
are suffering’ (I.16). Economic liberalization had enabled increased consumption, but only for the
rich and few middle-class people with a reliable formal sector job. Some thought living costs were
‘very expensive’ (I.2). Despite these and other caveats, overall, the consensus was that Mozambi-
que had been a development success in the previous decade.
How were SMEs in downtown Maputo performing?
Overall, 87% of the SMEs had ‘good’ or ‘very good’ performance, suggesting that these companies
were succeeding. This optimistic outlook chimes with the narrative of development success. There
is a small, visible and successful formal economy that includes clothing retail, leisure activities and
construction that is providing middle-class employment for workers and proﬁt for business owners
(The Business Year, 2014). Notably, when questioned, owners and managers did not consider the
cost of wages or the skill level of employees to be constraints for their businesses; recruitment is
easy and there is an oversupply of labour in Maputo. Further interviews with workers highlighted
that jobs were difﬁcult to obtain. So, although these downtown SMEs were successful, they, along
with other formal sector private employers in Maputo, which account for only 10% of jobs, are
insufﬁcient to provide the mass employment required to address poverty (Vines et al., 2015).
The high cost of taxes and the payment of arbitrary ‘imposotos’ or fees to the police and civil
servants, which in some cases included corrupt payments, were a frequent problem for the
businesses researched. Macro-level liberalization had enabled major companies to negotiate
favourable tax agreements, but the SMEs did not reap the same beneﬁts of liberalization. At
the small and medium scale, entrepreneurs were frustrated by regulation. The four other main
challenges were: (i) competition with foreign businesses in the construction sector; (ii) compe-
tition with other Mozambican businesses; (iii) high cost of rent of property and (iv) the falling
rate of proﬁts. In general, while particular ﬁrms may view competition negatively, the presence
of a competitive marketplace across Maputo, allied to the fact that businesses had good perform-
ance, implies that the small formal urban service economy is buoyant. The impacts of high prop-
erty prices and a ‘greedy’ landlord class, which extracts surplus value from the hospitality and retail
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sectors, were seen as negative impacts for Mozambican and foreign businesses alike. Other chal-
lenges facing businesses were around the infrastructure problems associated with the road net-
work, electricity supply and delays in receiving imports, which are all emblematic of a lack of
infrastructure development in Mozambique.
What was the role of foreign investment in economic change?
The interviewees were regularly in contact with international visitors, and 93% agreed or
strongly agreed that foreign investors contributed to economic growth. In open questioning,
respondents gave positive answers that highlighted the need for FDI ‘as Mozambicans don’t
have the funds to invest’ (I.63) and the beneﬁts of formal sector employment, although some
respondents were critical of the expatriation of earnings: ‘They have positive impacts because
we gain jobs, but negative because they are taking proﬁts’ (I.2). Owners were concerned by com-
petition ‘They are not good they are stealing our work places and businesses’ (I.3) and pressure
on commercial space which was driving up rents. Interviewees were asked to rank the impor-
tance of foreign investors in Mozambique in general (not in regard to their business) and
were given the choice of the ﬁve BRICS and Portugal. China was clearly identiﬁed as the
most important investor, and was ranked ﬁrst by three quarters of respondents (ranked ﬁrst
75 times), the modal ranking for South Africa was second (n = 44), Portugal third (n = 38), Bra-
zil fourth (n = 40), India ﬁfth (n = 66) and Russia was a distant sixth, ranked last by nearly all
respondents (n = 95), reﬂecting the limited Russian engagement in the Mozambican economy.
Other countries mentioned at least ﬁve times as important sources of FDI were Nigeria (30),
USA (14), Somalia (9),2 Japan (7), South Korea (5) and Zimbabwe (5). There was a clear indi-
cation that foreign businesses had increased in Mozambique over the decade. The nationalities
and sectors that had increased the most were the Chinese in construction and clothing, South
Africans in food retail, Brazilians also in clothing and Portuguese across a range of sectors
including construction and food retail.
While foreign investors were perceived to be good for the Mozambican economy in general,
when it came to the treatment of workers, respondents were critical of foreign employers; 58%
of respondents thought that they were worse than Mozambican employers, 13% the same and
29% better than local employers, but these numbers conceal differences. The open interviews
showed a clearer and persistent pattern of negative attitudes towards certain national groups.
Some foreign managers offered only: ‘aggression, racism and low salaries’ (I.17). Examples dis-
cussed mainly included the Chinese employers, especially in construction: ‘The Chinese treat
their employees badly and without respect’ (I.37), ‘The Chinese are racist’ (I.55) and ‘The Chinese
beat their workers’ (I.42) other examples are an ‘Indian spat on a worker and called her poor’ (I.11)
and there were further negative comments about Indian as well as Nigerian employers. The ‘Bra-
zilians are better’ (I.33) was a common observations and there were mixed reﬂections on the Por-
tuguese. One interviewee reported being involved in an incident when a building collapsed and the
Portuguese company avoided responsibility. South Africans were discussed less frequently, as they
had similar labour standards to those of Mozambicans. Overall, interviews reinforced the statistics
that showed that foreign employers were worse than local employers. This included arguments
from both workers employed at domestic and foreign-owned companies. For locally owned
businesses, foreign ﬁrms were most important as suppliers of goods and services. The increased
availability of foreign-made goods had enabled new opportunities to ‘build shops and create
jobs’ in retail and services (I.96). Through interview discussion, it was evident that the greatest
effect of foreign investors was that they shaped the overall economy rather than particular sectors,
such as clothing retail. Construction was the exception, as it was a sector where experienced
foreign contractors had a comparative advantage in terms of capital and the skills and technologies
required for complex projects. In particular, ‘The Chinese are the competitors and charge less
money’ for construction projects (I.65). In terms of fostering new approaches to enterprise, the
Was Africa rising? 13
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE
interviewees recognized opportunities to learn about innovation, management, staff motivation,
customer experience and ‘entrepreneurship and the spirit of business’ (I.63).
What was the role of the FRELIMO government in facilitating or hindering
business?
Economic growth and the expansion of business in Mozambique had fostered inequality and pro-
duced hot-spots of accumulation in Maputo (Castel-Branco, 2015; Melo, 2013). Between 2004
and 2014, the businesses in the sample population had beneﬁtted from the wider context of econ-
omic change and liberalization in Mozambique. Elites within political society, meaning both key
members of FRELIMO and as their allied interests in major business, had also beneﬁted from
reforms: ‘The impact is positive for the president and leaders, but worse for us workers, nothing
is improving’ (I.62). When interviewees were asked about the speciﬁc effect of government policy
on their business, they focused on the immediate impact on daily transactions, rather than the
transformation of the macro-economic climate that had boosted clothing retail, leisure and con-
struction and enabled their middle-class jobs. In Maputo, state policy created challenges that dis-
rupted SMEs: ‘Government should be reversed, and simpliﬁed to improve businesses’ (I.98). The
sample population did not view FRELMO as a liberal pro-enterprise party, but rather one that can
stiﬂe SMEs, while providing opportunities for large capital. Some were concerned that there was a
lack of regulation of FDI, especially at the larger scale: ‘it is the fault of the lack of clear rules of
what they can and cannot do here in Mozambique’ (I.81). At the same time, there was frustration
with local bureaucracy that inhibits business, including measures that a prototypical liberal regime
would want to diminish to ‘free’ enterprise (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Obstfeld, 1998). The
‘impostos’ or taxes and charges, associated with doing business were a major issue and this includes
the regulations that dictate work, but also surveillance and petty harassment from police. More
challenging was the problem of graft and the need to ‘reduce corruption’ (I.73) to enable
SMEs to grow.
MAPUTO’S MIDDLE CLASS: FRUSTRATED AND SATISFIED WITH
FAILURES AND SUCCESSES
The ﬁeldwork cannot answer the question ‘was Mozambique rising?’ As previously discussed,
there is strong evidence of national economic growth, but a persuasive argument that the pro-
grammes of liberalization and donor-led development interventions failed to reduce poverty
(Alfani et al., 2012; Bertelsen, 2016; Cunguara, 2012). The ﬁeld research showed that some
people working in SMEs in Maputo were experiencing the beneﬁts of increased foreign invest-
ment, as well as new opportunities for consumption. They generally believed in the success
story, but this was expected, as these people were selected because they were the potential ‘winners’
fromMozambique’s liberalization (IMF, 2011). Economic growth had delivered some observable
gains for the middle class (Mazzolini, 2016). And yet, the sample population recognized Mozam-
bique was not an unambiguous success story. The sample of respondents had enjoyed improve-
ments in their livelihoods, which they felt had left them better off than the poorer majority
working both in the informal economy of Maputo and in rural areas. At the same time, the par-
ticipants were well aware that the higher class of Mozambique’s elite were disproportionally gain-
ing from the sustained growth of the economy. Three important points of failure raised by the
interviewees require further analysis and can help to explain their ambiguous feelings.
First, participants raised concerns around the uneven development that was being reproduced.
They recognized that foreign investment in ﬁelds such as aluminium processing, offshore gas and
coal mining were bringing new money into Mozambique and this created some new urban
employment. However, the interviewees’ middle-class jobs in the service sector accounted for a
small proportion of Maputo’s population. There is a limit to how many middle-class jobs can
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be generated in serving afﬂuent and middle-class consumers in the hospitality and clothing sectors
as well as in construction. Rather than a generalized improvement for the majority of Mozambi-
que’s population in the ‘middle’ of the socio-economic hierarchy, a relatively small number of for-
mal jobs have been created outside of the immediate natural resource sector. Interviewees were
critical because the overwhelming majority remained poor. In addition to growth, economic lib-
eralization had brought new opportunities for consumption; yet, as Hanlon and Smart (2008)
illustrated in their provocatively titled book ‘Do bicycles equally development in Mozambique?’
there are few winners. The people who sold imported bicycles – or in the case of this study
sold imported garments, served coffee to business visitors or built foreign-ﬁnanced ofﬁce blocks
– have individually beneﬁted. But this type of economic activity does not generate widespread for-
mal middle-class employment. Neither does it connect to the rural economy and help lift the
masses out of impoverishment. Economic change in Mozambique between 2004 and 2014 failed
to address poverty due to high levels of inequality. According to the managers interviewed,
beneﬁts more often went to domestic elites or the foreign owners of large businesses rather
than to local entrepreneurial SMEs, suggesting poor progress towards the key objectives of the
2011–2014 Poverty Reduction Action Plan (IMF, 2011). There had been some SME growth
in the three sectors researched, but crucially, there had not been wider expansion in labour-
intensive industries (Cruz et al., 2017). Few people had entered the middle class. Among research
participants, there was recognition that they had above-average status in Mozambique, yet, their
middle-class status did not mean that they had escaped livelihood struggles, and many still suf-
fered incidences of poverty. At the same time, interviewees were frustrated by the increasing
inequality, the lack of wealth redistribution and the expatriation of proﬁts.
This leads on to the second point, which concerns relationships with foreign investment.
Overall, the respondents welcomed FDI, but were critical of the foreign employers’ treatment
of Mozambicans. The relationships were not characterized as neo-colonial, but some interviewees
recognized that Mozambique was dependent on external investment. Foreign ﬁrms created
growth, but led to vulnerable livelihoods, including labour abuses. Jobs in foreign-owned
SMEs were worse than local SMEs, but better than the alternatives in Maputo’s informal sector
and offered precarious membership of the middle class; therefore, workers accepted the sacriﬁce of
their tenuous rights. Exploitation of labour was viewed as being part of Mozambique’s embrace of
foreign capital. Elsewhere in southern Africa, research with Chinese- and Taiwanese-managed
ﬁrms in Zambia and South Africa, respectively, showed that foreign managers organized work
in a radically different way from their African counterparts and were inﬂuenced by the evolution
of their home economies and societies (Hart, 2002). Chinese managers in particular introduced
changes to formal sector labour regimes including the casualization and strict disciplining of work-
places (Brooks, 2010). Unregulated foreign investors setting up business in societies with a labour
surplus, such as Mozambique, can afford to drive down both labour standards and salaries. This
means that middle-class livelihoods remained precarious. Evidence from the interviews showed
that the situation was different from the narrative that celebrated Maputo’s rising middle class
as clear winners of economic globalization (IDA, 2009; IMF, 2014). Instead of unbridled capit-
alism, some interviewees argued that foreign investors should have been more tightly regulated by
the state to protect workers’ rights.
Local entrepreneurs who owned SMEs wanted to emulate foreign business. The Mozambican
petite-bourgeoisie could have enhanced their individual enterprises’ proﬁts if they learnt from
foreign innovations, but if the state truly wantedMozambique to follow in the footsteps of nations
such as China, which recorded rapid growth and poverty reduction in the 2000s, then they need to
reduce dependency on foreign investment and expand formal sector employment (Arrighi, 2007).
Mozambique should have addressed the failure to develop labour-intensive industries in order to
grow the middle class (Cruz et al., 2017). Instead, what emerged in the vibrant business district of
downtownMaputo were a small number of highly visible local entrepreneurial and foreign-owned
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SMEs concentrated in service sectors or structurally integrated with the liberalized, natural
resource-dependent economy. The worse of these employers were foreign owned and had precar-
ious employment practices and vulnerable workers. Notably in the technically demanding con-
struction sector, foreign companies were out-competing Mozambican ﬁrms and exploiting
employees.
Thirdly, a ﬁnal ﬁnding, which nuances the rising narrative and the effects of economic liberal-
ization and aid interventions, was the failure of both infrastructure projects and structural adjust-
ment programmes to facilitate the emergence of a broad middle class. The government and their
donor partners had been unable to deliver the banking, electricity, road and port facilities that
businesspeople needed to sustain and grow their enterprises (Vines et al., 2015). Neither had
the ERPs enabled a truly liberal environment for SMEs to ﬂourish in Maputo, especially in sec-
ondary manufacturing industries (Cruz et al., 2017). The machinery of socialism had been dis-
mantled, but in its place had arisen systems of regulation and formal and informal taxation that
inhibited entrepreneurship. So, while at the macro level the policies of liberalization had encour-
aged FDI, enabled large-scale investors to grow businesses in the extractive industry, and stimu-
lated the import of consumer goods, these same principles had not been applied to removing the
regulations that constrained entrepreneurial SMEs. This includes business regulation such as per-
mission from the local council – rather than labour protection – and also petty harassment from
ofﬁcials. The regulation of business in Maputo and associated corruption supported the liveli-
hoods of people working within the local state apparatus including the police and local govern-
ment, who in turn also bolstered the authority of the ruling party. The partidarização of the
state apparatus has ensured that there is a strong connection between advantageous position in
civil service and support for FRELIMO (Pérez Niño & Le Billon, 2014).
EXTRAVERSION WORKS IN RISING AFRICA
Despite development failures, Mozambique worked in 2014 as a prototype of Africa rising. Cha-
bal and Daloz (1999) built upon Bayart’s (1993) thesis of extraversion to argue that ‘Africa works’:
the political economy of African nations worked to beneﬁt the local elite, which perpetuated itself.
Africa was functional rather than inoperative. The Africa rising narrative which took hold in the
2000s and 2010s reinforced the status quo and was therefore enthusiastically embraced by both
local elites and the international community (Taylor, 2016). The middle class were a pawn in
this game. They were foregrounded in debates because they reinforced a false narrative of a col-
lective ‘Africa rising’, but in reality, they were numerically small and politically weak (Melber,
2016). Their livelihoods could also remain precarious, as was the case in Maputo in 2014.
Mozambicans working in SMEs were critical of uneven development, concerned by foreign
investment and frustrated by the role of the state. The three failures were enabled by state and
non-state actors within political society. African elites are active rather than dependent and passive
in their relationships with foreign donors and investors. FRELIMO’s leadership made sure that
the Mozambican state became structurally biased towards a reworked version of capitalism, which
led to the contradictions identiﬁed by the research participants for two interconnected reasons.
One was that the state became dependent upon revenue derived from international investment
projects and sources of donor ﬁnance linked to maintaining political conditions that promoted
the free market (Hanlon & Cunguara, 2010). The other reason was to meet the priorities of lead-
ing ﬁgures within FRELIMO who mediated the relationship between the national economy and
global markets and built alliances with new sources of FDI (Hanlon & Mosse, 2010). Domestic
and international capitalist and state elites shared the objectives of generating proﬁt, so forged a
homologous relationship. Elites within FRELIMO aligned with the interests of foreign capital to
enable the exploitation of Mozambique’s economy. Some shared interests were easy to identify.
For instance, President Guebuza was also on the board of Cornelder, the company that managed
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the Beira and Quelimane ports and the toll road linking Maputo to Nelspruit in South Africa
(Nhachote, 2012). Ensuring that these entrepôts were busy exporting Mozambique’s natural
resources and importing consumer goods was both good for Mozambique’s president and richest
man, as well as foreign capital. Guebuza was not alone and other prominent leaders within FRE-
LIMO ‘consolidated their business interests as shareholders and local partners for foreign inves-
tors’ (Pérez Niño & Le Billon, 2014, p. 91).
The notion of ‘Africa rising’ was a cliché (Taylor, 2016), but it deserved to be taken seriously
when applied to Mozambique, as it included at least a kernel of truth. Socialism had been success-
fully replaced by the free market. Development was occurring in Mozambique, as long as devel-
opment success only meant the uneven expansion of capitalism. There was FDI from the BRICS,
new construction projects in Maputo, a growing tourist economy, a boom in natural resource
exports and more consumer goods in the stores. Compared to the 1990s, there had been some
reduction in poverty, but progress stalled in the 2000s–2010s (Alfani et al., 2012). Mozambique
was celebrated by some important political actors (UN News Centre, 2013). At the same time,
many development programmes were failing to reduce poverty. Growth had produced a record
number of millionaires, rather than lifting millions out of poverty (Kew, 2015). People in the
middle in Maputo had enjoyed some beneﬁts, but their livelihoods were still tenuous. They
were frustrated, and their middle-class status could not be emulated by the wider population. Pol-
icies that worked for international capital did not properly serve the interests of SMEs nor foster a
large rising middle class.
Mozambique worked as a means of enabling extraversion and thus it was important for pol-
itical society to perpetuate the ‘successfulness’ of development, as it facilitated FRELIMO’s elec-
toral success and brought beneﬁt to both the Mozambican elite and their international allies in big
business. On a continental scale, Mozambique served as an important ﬁgurehead for the wider
Africa rising narrative (IMF, 2014). There was a broader need to make sure that the success nar-
rative was sustained, which goes beyond FRELIMO’s desire to gain re-election, because donor
interventions and liberal policies also needed to be promoted and legitimized to facilitate the con-
tinual reworking of capitalism (Moran & Pitcher, 2004). The majority of Mozambicans did not
fully own their own development story (Castel-Branco, 2015). Yet, not only have Mozambicans
not owned their own development, some, including many of the ﬁeld research participants, have
lost sight of what positive social change really means. Some middle-class Mozambicans even
believe that the uneven advance of capitalism in tandem with the stagnation of social indicators
and persistence of poverty represents an African success story.
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NOTES
1. As the focus is on the middle class formally employed in SMEs, the informal micro-enterprises of the poor were
not researched.
2. There are a small number of entrepreneurial Somalian-operated shops in Maputo. In neighbouring South
Africa, informal Somalian ‘spaza shops’ are common. Somalians ﬂed their country to escape civil war in the
1990s. A survey of 543 spaza shops in Cape Town found that 36.8% of them were run by Somali nationals (Sus-
tainable Livelihoods Foundation, 2014, p. 4).
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